Decentralization and the duration of fiscal consolidation: Shifting the burden across layers of government by Foremny, Dirk et al.
1 
 
Decentralization and the duration of fiscal consolidation: 
Shifting the burden across layers of government(*) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper analyses the relationship between fiscal decentralization, the duration of fiscal 
consolidation episodes, and their success for 17 OECD countries between 1978 and 2009. The 
consolidation of the general government budget appears to be of longer duration when expenditure 
decentralization is higher. We also find that transfers from higher levels of government are cut during 
consolidation episodes, suggesting that central governments shift the burden of consolidation towards 
lower tiers of government. This is especially true when the latter have little legal autonomy to raise 
tax revenues and have little influence over executive decisions taken at the central level. We 
document that this increases local governments’ public debt/GDP ratios. In terms of the success of 
consolidation episodes, countries with a higher degree of decentralization appear to make smaller 
improvements in their primary balance when consolidating.  
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1. Introduction  
In the wake of the recent financial and economic crisis and during the ensuing recession, many OECD 
countries have opted to consolidate their general government balances. To achieve this goal, many 
have implemented severe austerity packages, with highly controversial results (Blyth, 2013). General 
questions related to fiscal consolidation, including political economy considerations and 
macroeconomic conditions, have been studied extensively in the literature (Price, 2010; Mauro, 2011; 
Grüner, 2013). Yet, despite the fact that many central governments have recently delegated substantial 
powers to sub-national entities (Rodríguez-Pose and Ezcurra, 2011), the question as to whether fiscal 
decentralization strengthens government ability to implement fiscal adjustment measures remains 
unanswered.1  
A key question concerning fiscal consolidation is its duration, a factor that is closely related 
to its effectiveness (see, e.g., Bi et al., 2013).2 This appears to have been confirmed in the on-going 
debate as to which factors help sustain an enduring consolidation effort. The point at stake seems to 
be the following: what is the optimal speed of fiscal consolidation and how long should it be 
implemented for? In other words, should governments concentrate their efforts at the beginning of the 
process and subsequently relax policy measures, or should they adopt the inverse approach? 
Blanchard and Leigh (2013) claim that these decisions depend on country-specific factors including, 
but not limited to, the level of public debt, economic growth, and interest rates. For example, austerity 
measures implemented in times of low or negative growth may damage the economy rather than help 
it recover (Ostry et al., 2016) and, in such cases, there may be better strategies than upfront fiscal 
consolidation.  
The arguments for concentrating consolidation efforts at the beginning of the process have to 
be seen in the light of the default risks perceived by the financial markets and of the costs of serving 
public debt, since immediate fiscal adjustment measures might increase a government’s credibility 
and relieve markets.3 This hypothesis is confirmed by Briotti (2004), who identifies persistent fiscal 
adjustment efforts as the best way to enhance credibility and ensure success as measured in terms of 
impact on deficits, debt, and growth performances. More recently, Barrios et al. (2010) have argued 
that sharp, sustained consolidations are more likely to be successful in countries with high starting 
debt levels and high interest rates (or low GDP growth potential), but that more gradual adjustments 
are preferable when these constraints are more relaxed.   
                                                          
1 A previous version of this paper was presented at the OECD Fiscal Federalism Network Workshop in Paris 
and some of the results were published in the conference volume “OECD Fiscal Federalism Studies Institutions 
of Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations Challenges Ahead: Challenges Ahead” (Foremny et al., 2014).  
2 According to Bi et al. (2013), the duration of fiscal consolidation – beyond its nature and composition – 
matters in terms of determining the extent to which a given consolidation is expansionary and/or successful in 
stabilising government debt. 
3 This was the case of Ireland in 2010, when the government decided to frontload a four-year, 15 billion euro 
deficit correction sooner rather than later. 
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However, despite the obvious importance of determining the optimum duration of a fiscal 
consolidation, no clear consensus has yet been reached. Thus, the hypothesis that decentralization can 
play a role in this process – in terms of how, to what extent, and with what results – is an appealing 
research question. A recent IMF policy paper (2014) recognizes the importance of intergovernmental 
fiscal coordination for the development of an effective consolidation plan. Indeed, institutional 
arrangements for coordinating financial decision-making between levels of government appear to be 
an increasingly important factor in the success of a government’s adjustment strategies.4 However, the 
fiscal objectives of most advanced economies tend to cover the general government sector only, and 
recognize no clearly identifiable contribution of sub-national levels of government to the targeted 
balance and debt position. Additionally, there is no pre-determined distribution of the adjustment 
burden across the various layers of government, and so it remains dependent on the strength of 
intergovernmental fiscal arrangements. An examination of the recent experiences of advanced 
countries seems to show that sub-national governments deliver a proportionally larger share of the 
overall reduction in the general government deficit than is delivered by the central government 
(Blöchliger, 2013; Vammalle and Hulbert, 2013). Our research explores this point in greater depth by 
analyzing the relationship between fiscal consolidation and decentralization. Should decentralization 
prove to be related to the duration of the former, this would have significant policy implications with 
different ramifications for federal and centralized countries. 
From a theoretical viewpoint, fiscal decentralization may either favor or impede the 
governmental consolidation efforts. On the one hand, in a more decentralized system, the number of 
veto players increases, impeding the adoption of corrective packages and potentially deteriorating into 
a typical common-pool problem. Indeed, in times of crisis, a combination of deficit bias and 
coordination failures due to fiscal decentralization may result in over-spending (and/or under-
taxation) tendencies at the sub-national level as well as the adoption of conflicting fiscal stances by 
central and sub-central levels (see, e.g., Jonas, 2012; Eyraud and Moreno Badia, 2013; Foremny and 
von Hagen, 2012). 
Central governments, on the other hand, may consolidate their balances by simply cutting 
their inter-governmental transfers to sub-national units. In this way, they avoid having to face the 
direct political costs of such unpopular measures. The more expenditure is in the hands of sub-central 
tiers of government without corresponding revenue powers (as tends to be the case in most 
decentralized and advanced economies, see Blӧchliger and Vammalle, 2012), the more the burden can 
be shifted to sub-national levels. However, in these circumstances, the reaction of local governments 
to the negative revenue shock is crucial. If the reduction in transfers simply translates into an increase 
                                                          
4 Neyapti (2010, 2013) puts forward the idea that decentralization could be considered an appropriate 
institutional mechanism able to sustain fiscal adjustment and to promote fiscal discipline over time. Escolano et 
al. (2012) claim that the latter is particularly true when sub-central governments have the power to raise 
adequate resources and revenues to cover their expenditures. 
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in sub-national deficits, there will be no consolidation from a general government perspective. Today, 
various cooperative arrangements (including, internal stability pacts and sub-national fiscal rules) 
have been put in place between central and sub-national governments (as exemplified by Austria, 
Germany and Italy), making sub-national constraints more binding and fiscal adjustment targets easier 
to achieve. 
All those possibilities are all heavily dependent on the financing structure of the different 
levels of government: just how much autonomy do local governments really have over their budgets? 
Foremny and von Hagen (2013) suggest that the real degree of sub-central autonomy and reliance on 
transfers can have a critical impact on the relationship between decentralization and consolidation 
efforts. The authors report that sub-national governments in unitary countries experienced a 
significant increase in transfers from central government during the Great Recession, something that 
did not occur in the federal states. This suggests that the composition of transfers and changes in their 
configuration during periods of consolidation may depend on the degree of fiscal decentralization, and 
on the true assignment of power to different tiers of government. In close relation to this, the presence 
of sub-national fiscal rules that limit certain budgetary items may also influence the duration and 
intensity of adjustment episodes. However, evidence of the disciplinary effects of sub-national rules 
(Nannicini et al, 2016; Escolano et al., 2012, Foremny, 2014; Reuter, 2015) has not been able yet to 
disentangle the discipline effect from the possibility of simultaneous bailouts from upper levels of 
government.  
Our aim here, therefore, is to combine the literature on fiscal consolidation with that on fiscal 
federalism and decentralization. The specific question we address is whether more decentralized 
countries consolidate their budgets for longer periods than it is the case with more centralized 
countries. We then examine the possible mechanisms behind our findings. More specifically, we 
study how central government transfers change during periods of consolidation as a means of 
determining whether such transfers are used by central governments to achieve their consolidation 
objectives. Finally, we analyze how countries with different systems of decentralization achieve their 
consolidation objectives in terms of the impact on public deficit and public debt, that is, we examine 
the relationship between fiscal decentralization and the success of the consolidation effort.5 
Our main finding can be stated as follows: periods of fiscal consolidation are of longer 
duration in countries in which a higher proportion of public spending is in the hands of sub-central 
tiers of government. This is especially true when such governments do not enjoy any real autonomy 
                                                          
5 The main drawback of such an analysis is that the term “success” in this context can be defined in many ways. 
Thus, the effects of a period of consolidation might be perceived positively or negatively depending on the 
means adopted to achieve fiscal sustainability. For example, according to one strand in the literature (e.g., 
Alesina and Perotti, 1995; Alesina and Ardagna, 2010), a fiscal consolidation is deemed successful if the 
reduction in the debt-to-GDP ratio (or the primary budget balance-to-GDP ratio) is sufficiently large and 
persistent. In contrast, another strand (e.g., Lodge and Rodriguez-Vives, 2013) defines “success” in terms of the 
persistence (length or longevity) of the fiscal consolidation effort over time. In the analyses undertaken here, we 
take into account both these aspects of the success of a fiscal consolidation episode. 
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over their revenues. We also document a decrease in intergovernmental transfers during episodes of 
consolidation, suggesting that central governments shift the burden of consolidation onto lower levels 
of government whenever possible, at the expense of prolonging the consolidation process. Finally, we 
show that consolidation is, on average, less capable of improving the budget balance/GDP ratio in 
more decentralized countries, but at the same time it is less damaging in terms of its impact on the 
public debt/GDP ratio in these countries. Our findings have interesting implications given the 
widespread concerns regarding the fiscal imbalances that currently characterize most developed 
economies. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 offers a brief literature review of fiscal 
consolidation, focusing on such aspects as its duration, determinants, and success. Section 3 illustrates 
the empirical strategy we adopt to investigate our research question. Section 4 contains the results of 
the analysis, and Section 5 concludes.  
 
2. Related literature 
Studies of fiscal consolidation have focused their attention on such issues as the factors that lead to 
the adoption of consolidation efforts, the determinants of their success, and the duration of the 
episodes. Existing empirical studies focus primarily on OECD countries, while interest in the subject 
has been revived by the recent economic and financial crisis and the calls heard for fiscal adjustments 
in most industrialized countries. 
First, it should be stressed that there is no single definition of what constitutes a successful 
consolidation effort. For instance, Von Hagen and Strauch (2001) measure success in terms of the 
reduction in the budget deficit achieved at the end of the adjustment period. Alesina and Ardagna 
(2010) define a consolidation effort as having been successful when the cyclically adjusted primary 
balance (CAPB) as a share of GDP improves by 1.5 percentage points or more. Barrios et al. (2010) 
distinguish between “cold shower” improvements of 1.5 percentage points in the CAPB that are 
recorded in the space of one year and “gradual consolidations” that take place over three years if in 
each year the CAPB does not deteriorate by more than 0.5 percent of GDP.  
An alternative definition considers a consolidation effort successful if the decrease in gross 
public debt achieved at the end of the episode has made the latter either sustainable or substantially 
lower than it was at the outset (Heylen and Everaert, 2000), although the debt/GDP ratio usually 
increases following a consolidation effort (Ardagna, 2009) due to the adverse effects on the 
denominator of this ratio.6 Additionally, it might be claimed that the success of a fiscal adjustment 
program is related to the persistence of the consolidation effort: that is, for how long can, and should, 
a government consolidate its balances?  
                                                          
6 Debt sustainability is not readily defined. Neck and Sturm (2008, p. 1) claim that “although sustainability of 
public finance has been discussed for more than a century now, it is still an imprecise concept”. 
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Changes in the expenditure/revenue mix would seem to play a key role in determining the 
outcome of a consolidation effort, although there is no consensus on the exact nature of those 
changes. On the one hand, spending-based adjustments are more likely to be successful, as they 
appear to be linked to longer lasting reductions in deficit/GDP ratios (e.g., Alesina and Perotti, 1995, 
Afonso, Nickel, and Rother, 2006; Barrios, Langedijk, and Pench, 2010; Alesina and Ardagna, 2012). 
Devries et al. (2011) also claim that spending-based adjustments have been less contractionary in the 
past, but only because of accommodative monetary policy. At the same time, relying on higher taxes 
to reduce deficits may damage potential growth by discouraging labor market participation, and by 
lowering investment and firm profitability due to the distortionary impact of taxes (especially those on 
income).  
On the other hand, revenue-based consolidations may be more effective in terms of fiscal 
adjustments, particularly if they involve the revenues that are potentially less harmful for growth, that 
is, user fees, environmental taxes, property taxes and value-added taxes (Heylen and Everaert, 2000; 
Tsibouris et al., 2006). In fact, revenue-based consolidations have been implemented in the past and 
several scholars recognize their effectiveness, especially when initial revenue-to-GDP ratios are 
relatively low. Moreover, it appears that the ex post composition of adjustments often turns out to be 
different to those originally planned, with expenditure cuts falling short of target and over-performing 
revenue changes (Tsibouris et al., 2006; Mauro, 2011; Mauro and Villafuerte, 2013). 
In addition to changes in the expenditure/revenue mix, initial conditions also seem to matter 
in determining the success of fiscal consolidation efforts. In their seminal contribution, Von Hagen 
and Strauch (2001) investigate when fiscal adjustments are likely to be initiated, and under what 
circumstances consolidation efforts are likely to be successful, for a sample of European countries 
during the 1990s. The cyclical positions of the domestic and the international economy, the initial 
debt level, and the fiscal policy stance are all shown to be important determinants of the likelihood of 
a fiscal consolidation, as well as of its success. Barrios et al. (2010) also report that countries facing 
higher initial levels of government debt have a higher probability of pursuing successful fiscal 
consolidations. Cafiso and Cellini (2014) stress that although a certain debt/GDP ratio may affect the 
likelihood of consolidation, the opposite is also true, as consolidation affects the debt dynamics. Their 
analysis of EU countries for the period 1980–2009 suggests that consolidation leads to lower 
debt/GDP values in the short-run, but not in the medium term. 
On the other hand, Alesina and Ardagna (2012) find initial conditions make no difference to 
the success or otherwise of a consolidation episode, while Devries et al. (2011) show that the role 
played by initial conditions is at best unclear. Molnar (2012) analyses the economic environment, 
political settings and policy measures conducive to fiscal consolidation and debt stabilization and 
finds that the existence of fiscal rules and cooperation between different tiers of government play a 
critical role in favor of fiscal adjustment programs. The political framework is also relevant as newly 
elected governments seem more likely to initiate and sustain fiscal consolidation, while non-centrist 
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political parties are less likely to make efforts to stabilize debt than are those closer to the center of the 
political spectrum. 
Another important dimension of a consolidation episode is its duration, an element that has 
usually been studied using survival analysis techniques. According to a European Commission study 
(2007), gradual consolidations tend to be more successful than quick, sharp adjustments, although the 
latter may be more effective in the case of high and rising debt levels. Below we summarize findings 
in relation to the duration of past fiscal adjustment efforts. 
Von Hagen et al. (2002) were the first to concentrate on the duration of fiscal consolidation 
episodes and to make the length of the consolidation efforts endogenous in the empirical analysis. 
Their influential results highlight the importance of consolidation fatigue and of fiscal conditions such 
as public debt over GDP in determining the duration of fiscal consolidation. Illera and Mulas-
Granados (2008) study the factors affecting the length of fiscal consolidation episodes, defined as the 
time spells between two fiscal expansions (which are in turn defined on the basis of the dynamics of 
the CAPB) in 15 European countries between 1960 and 2004. They find that the probability of a 
period of fiscal consolidation coming to an end, what the authors refer to as ‘failure’ (the term being 
taken from the standard survival analysis tools, where hazard functions are used to estimate the 
probability of a certain event, normally labelled as the ‘failure rate’), depends on such factors as the 
debt level, the magnitude of the adjustment, the relative contribution of spending cuts, and the degree 
of cabinet fragmentation.  
It is worth noting that defining consolidation episodes solely on the basis of cyclically 
adjusted budget balance improvements may constitute too narrow an approach, since not all periods in 
which the balance did not improve should be considered failures (e.g., governments may simply not 
want to consolidate). In this respect, the data and definition provided by the IMF (Devries et al., 2011) 
seem to be more appropriate for investigating the duration of consolidation efforts. Here, fiscal 
consolidation episodes are classified using a narrative/historical approach based on the analysis of the 
policymakers’ intentions and actions as described in contemporary policy documents. Thus, the tax 
and spending measures taken in such periods are motivated primarily by the desire to reduce the 
budget deficit and not by a response to prospective economic conditions. We employ this type of data 
in our empirical analysis and so avoid the potential bias attributable to measurement errors that 
potentially correlate with economic developments and omit those consolidation efforts that are 
followed by adverse shocks which offset the discretionary measures. A further consequence of using 
this definition of consolidation is that its success is not ‘embedded’ in the definition, as the episodes 
in our dataset do not depend on numerical changes in the public deficit. 
A more recent contribution to the study of the duration of consolidations is provided by 
Lodge and Rodriguez-Vives (2013), who estimate hazard functions for 20 advanced economies 
between 1970 and 2010. According to their analysis, the fiscal and macroeconomic conditions at the 
outset appear to affect the ability of governments to sustain lengthy consolidations. More precisely, 
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high debt and deficits, heavy interest burdens, and high bond yields all facilitate the initiation of 
consolidation (the so-called ‘push factors’); while, high private savings, strong external balance, 
competitiveness (measured by real exchange rate), and stable financial conditions facilitate its 
duration (the ‘pull factors’). Lodge and Rodriguez-Vives (2013) find that the composition of the fiscal 
adjustment (i.e. the split between expenditure and revenue measures) does not appear to be a 
significant determinant of the duration of consolidation. 
Agnello, Castro, and Sousa (2013), on the other hand, when using annual data for 17 
industrial countries over the period 1978–2009, find a difference between spending- and tax-driven 
consolidations, with the former episodes being shorter than the latter. Moreover, both types of 
consolidation are longer in Non-European countries than they are in European countries, while the 
size of the consolidation program (in percentage of GDP) is not significantly correlated with its 
duration.7 
As pointed out recently by the OECD (Vammalle and Hulbert, 2013), successful national 
consolidation strategies usually benefit from involving sub-national governments. Moreover, to be 
successful, they also need to take into account the financial situation of these sub-national tiers so as 
to maintain the local authorities’ capacity to deliver major public services. Failure to do so can lead to 
breakdowns in coordination between different tiers of government, with adverse consequences for 
fiscal adjustment actions. Although it is widely acknowledged that sub-national governments are key 
players in fiscal policy-making, few studies of the duration of consolidations have paid close attention 
to their role and examined fiscal decentralization and intergovernmental fiscal relations.  
There is limited empirical evidence available on this question. In the case of emerging market 
economies, Thornton and Adedeji (2010) find that sub-national governments have, in the past, 
contributed to successful general government fiscal adjustments by cutting their capital expenditures 
and raising their own tax revenues. In contrast, Baldacci et al. (2006) find no robust effects of fiscal 
decentralization (measured with simple dummies indicating the authority states and provinces have 
over fiscal policy) on the success of fiscal consolidation in a panel of 25 emerging market economies 
(note, they build on previous research on emerging economies by Adam and Bevan, 2003, and Gupta 
et al., 2005).  
In the case of developed countries, Schaltegger and Feld (2009), in a case study of the Swiss 
cantons, find that fiscal centralization significantly decreases the probability of a successful fiscal 
consolidation, suggesting that competitive fiscal federalism may positively impact fiscal discipline. 
Darby et al.’s (2005) study of fiscal consolidations in OECD countries lends further support to the 
idea of the constructive participation of sub-national governments, with fiscal consolidations 
                                                          
7 Studies of the duration of fiscal adjustment episodes have also been performed for a sample of developing 
countries where, using survival analysis, expenditure composition, the size of the fiscal consolidation, and past 
performance on fiscal consolidation are identified as factors that affect the persistence of the adjustment (Gupta 
et al., 2004). 
9 
 
occurring at both central and sub-national levels. While other articles have investigated the role of 
fiscal federalism in the context of fiscal consolidation, they have not focused their attention on its 
relationship with the duration of the episode. It is this gap that we attempt to fill here with our original 
empirical research.  
 
 
3. Empirical approach 
 
3.1 Data 
The data used in this paper are collected from various sources. First, data on consolidation episodes 
are provided by the IMF and are based on an analytical examination of budget policy documents, 
budget speeches, reports submitted to national banks and supranational organizations, which seeks to 
identify the intention of governments to initiate a period of consolidation (Devries et al., 2011, outline 
the historical approach followed in gathering the data and offer a detailed explanation). In the dataset, 
the consolidation dummy takes the value 1 in those years in which the government expressed the will 
to consolidate its balances. Relevant documents identify policy actions that are motivated by attempts 
to reduce the deficit, certifying the will of policy-makers at the beginning of a fiscal consolidation 
program (i.e., when decisions were taken), as well as of the budgetary impact of these measures 
during and at the end of the adjustment. 
This approach limits our sample to 17 OECD countries8 for the period 1978–2009, but it 
provides us with a more reliable approach than if we were to identify consolidation episodes solely on 
the basis of changes in the cyclically adjusted primary balance. For example, the latter method may 
lead us to consider instances in which the budget balance improved owing to circumstances other than 
that of the government’s will to consolidate its finances. Likewise, cyclically adjusted series may 
suffer from measurement errors that are likely to correlate with economic developments (for similar 
applications, see Agnello et al. 2013). Moreover, if our definition of consolidation is based on 
improvements in the cyclically adjusted primary balance, any evaluation of success might suffer from 
a sample selection problem and an overestimation of the success of the consolidation episodes. 
Second, we augment the dataset with information about fiscal decentralization, edec, 
measured in terms of the proportion of expenditure in the hands of sub-central governments divided 
by the general government’s expenditure (source: OECD). This is the standard approach to measuring 
the degree of fiscal decentralization, although it does tend to overstate the real degree of autonomy 
held by sub-national governments, given that some types of expenditure are labelled ‘local’ even 
                                                          
8 The countries included in our sample are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United 
States. 
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though sub-central governments have little power over them and they can be mandated by the central 
government or spent on its behalf (Ebel and Yilmaz, 2003).9  
For this reason, we also include measures that accounting for real sub-national autonomy. 
These additional variables address matters of fiscal autonomy, the executive influence of sub-national 
sectors, and the co-determination of policy making between sub-national and central levels of 
government. This information is provided by the Regional Authority Indices developed by Hooghe et 
al. (2010). Fiscal autonomy (fiscal autonomy) is a measure of the extent to which a regional 
government can independently tax its population. The minimum value (0) applies when the central 
government fixes all regional tax bases and rates, while the maximum (5) applies when the regional 
government has the right to define the tax base and rate of at least one major tax. Executive influence 
(executive influence) is defined as the extent to which a regional government can affect and co-
determine national policy at intergovernmental meetings and ranges between 0 and 2. Finally, the 
indicator of co-determination (shared ruling) increases if a regional government can exercise 
authority by co-determining decision-making at the national level either by direct participation in the 
design of national laws, by sharing executive responsibilities with the national government, or by 
having an influence on the distribution of tax revenues in the country as a whole. This third indicator 
varies between 0 and 12 and also takes into account whether the regional government can exercise 
any authority over the country’s constitutional set-up. 
All the other variables employed in the analysis have been selected from the few studies 
conducted to date reporting duration analyses of fiscal consolidations (Von Hagen et al., 2002; Illera 
and Mulas-Granados, 2002; Molnar, 2012; Agnello et al., 2013); however, the literature has not 
reached a consensus yet on which controls should be included in the type of analysis performed here. 
The controls in our model are defined as follows: a) debt and debt(t-1), the contemporaneous and the 
one-year lagged values of gross public debt divided by GDP, respectively, taken from the IMF 
Historical Debt database compiled by Mauro et al. 2013; b) primary balance(t-1), the lagged general 
government primary balance over GDP (source: OECD), which, together with a), accounts for the 
initial fiscal conditions that might affect the duration of the consolidation episodes; c) real gdp 
growth, the growth rate of real GDP per capita (source: Penn World Tables) to capture the 
macroeconomic conditions likely to be influencing the duration of consolidation; d) election year, a 
dummy carrying information about election years; e) government type, a categorical variable taking 
the following values: 1 for single-party majority governments, 2 for minimal winning coalitions, 3 for 
surplus coalitions, 4 for single-party minority governments, 5 for multi-party minority governments, 
and 6 for caretaker governments; f) right wing, a dummy taking the value of 1 for right-wing 
governments and zero otherwise (source: the Comparative Political Dataset compiled by Armingeon 
et al., 2012). Note, variables d) to f) are included to control for the political factors affecting 
                                                          
9 Alternative measures of fiscal decentralization have been constructed (most notably, see Stegarescu, 2005), but 
their use would imply a severe loss in terms of missing observations. 
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consolidation. Finally, the effects of monetary policy are proxied by the following: g) Δ interest rate, 
the change in the nominal long-term interest rate on government bonds (source: OECD) and h) Δ 
interest payments, the change in the interest paid on public debt divided by GDP (source: IMF, Mauro 
et al. 2013). Finally, the type of fiscal consolidation can also influence duration and is represented by 
h) tax based consolidation, a dummy taking the value of 1 when consolidation is focused on the 
revenue-side of the budget. Table 1 shows the summary statistics for the variables in our analysis.  
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
Figure 1 presents the Kaplan-Meier survival function for the fiscal consolidation duration 
data. The length of the horizontal sections of the line on the x-axis represents the survival duration for 
that interval, which is determined by the end of the consolidation episode. For example, the 
probability of a consolidation episode lasting at least one year is 100%, which basically reflects the 
annual frequency of the data and the fact that there is at least one consolidation episode with a 
duration of only one year (in total, there are 13 such episodes in our sample). The probability 
decreases as the length of the consolidation episode increases, reaching zero for periods longer than 
14 years (the reason for this being that, in our sample, there is one 14-year long episode – Canada 
between 1984 and 1997 – and no episodes have a duration longer than this). The vertical distances 
between the horizontal sections of the line illustrate the change in cumulative probability of the 
consolidation episode ending as the curve advances. The most notable ‘jumps’ are associated with the 
consolidation episodes that last just a few years, and which are the most numerous in our sample (for 
example, there are 15 two-year episodes in the sample, but only 5 six-years episodes).  
 
[Figure 1 about here] 
 
3.2 Identification 
Our empirical approach comprises three separate steps. First, we perform a duration analysis in order 
to estimate the determinants of the duration of fiscal consolidation. The advantage of such an analysis 
is that it exploits all the information available in the data, enabling the treatment of the duration of 
fiscal consolidation as endogenous (Gupta et al., 2004). In this way, we are able to study how long 
governments managed to sustain uninterrupted periods of consolidation in the past and what factors 
affected their ability to do so. However, a number of caveats should be borne in mind, namely, that a 
duration analysis does not deal, among other things, with the economic and welfare consequences of 
consolidation, and it does not directly provide information about debt sustainability or the success of 
fiscal consolidation in achieving a lasting reduction in government debt ratios (Lodge and Rodriguez-
Vives, 2013). More importantly for our purposes, we wish to gain a full understanding of the impact 
of fiscal decentralization and sub-central autonomy on the duration of fiscal consolidation episodes. 
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To do so, we initially estimate the determinants of the time h employed by a country to consolidate 
with a standard duration model such as the following: 
 
     0,h t Z h t    Z X        (1) 
 
In our baseline specification, the baseline hazard h0 follows the Weibull model as this is the 
most flexible specification of those commonly employed in the literature. In this case, the following 
holds:    10h t p t

  . The parameter ρ as the baseline hazard is estimated as an endogenous part 
of the model. Vector Z includes the variables of decentralization and sub-central autonomy, which 
constitute the main focus of our analysis. X is a set of control variables. All variables vary over time 
throughout the respective consolidation episode. In the case of Z, we are interested in whether – and 
how – consolidation at the general level of government is affected by the degree of decentralization 
and by the sub-national institutional setting. Therefore, in the baseline model, we investigate the effect 
of expenditure decentralization and include only the variable edec in Z (in fact, for purposes of 
comparison and robustness, we also report the estimates arising from a parsimonious specification 
that excludes vector Z entirely and which conforms more closely to analyses in the existing 
literature).  
Subsequently, we estimate three alternative specifications of model (1), obtained by 
augmenting Z separately with each of the indicator variables that account for real sub-national 
autonomy (fiscal autonomy, executive influence, and shared ruling) and their respective interaction 
term with expenditure decentralization (edec). We focus on one indicator per specification to avoid 
potential issues of multicollinearity, as the three variables all seek to capture a similar dimension, i.e. 
real sub-central autonomy, and are likely to be correlated with each other. The control variables 
included in vector X are as listed in Section 3.1.  
The second step in our study involves an analysis of the impact of a consolidation period on 
sub-national public finances. Our aim here is not to provide causal estimates, but rather to present 
correlation-based evidence on whether or not fiscal consolidation has affected intergovernmental 
transfers to sub-national sectors. To do so, we estimate the following equation: 
 
, , ,log( )i t i t i i ttransfers consolidation       ,   (2) 
 
where Ω is equal to one of the three variables included in the interactions in the previous step. The 
dependent variable is the change in the intergovernmental transfers received by sub-national 
governments from the central government, for which descriptive statistics are reported in Table 1. To 
analyze the effect, we compute the marginal effect of the consolidation episodes, conditional on the 
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values of the interacted variable between the consolidation dummy and the real sub-central autonomy 
index (each introduced separately). 
The third and last step in our analysis involves examining the relationship between 
decentralization and the success of a government’s consolidation efforts, regarding which the 
literature provides scant evidence. A notable exception here is Schaltegger and Feld (2009), who 
suggest that more decentralized countries tend to be more successful in their consolidation strategies, 
although this result is based solely on data for the Swiss cantons. We use both descriptive statistics 
and simple econometrics to examine the relationship between decentralization and the numerical 
results achieved by the various consolidation episodes in our sample in terms of their effects on both 
the budget balance/GDP and the public debt/GDP ratios. This allows us to gain additional insights 
into the role of decentralization in government-led consolidation processes. 
 
4. Results 
 
4.1 The duration analysis 
Table 2 presents the estimates of equation (1) above. The first specification (reported in the first 
column of Table 2) includes only the control variables taken from the existing literature (vector X) 
and does not include the decentralization variable, which facilitates comparison of our results with 
those published in earlier analyses. The estimates in the second and third columns include expenditure 
decentralization (edec), which is, in fact, our main variable of interest.10 
 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
The negative and significant effect of edec (see both columns 2 and 3 in Table 2) indicates 
that more decentralized countries have a lower hazard rate, i.e., that the probability of a consolidation 
period lasting for an additional year increases with higher degrees of decentralization. Figure 2 
illustrates this survival function for different levels of decentralization. The survival function for 
countries with a 50% degree of decentralization (green line) is significantly shifted to the right 
compared to countries with lower degrees of decentralization. Therefore, ceteris paribus, more 
decentralized countries consolidate for longer periods. 
 
                                                          
10 Column 3 in Table 2 contains the estimates of the model using a different definition of expenditure 
decentralization. In this specification, the decentralization ratio is held constant over time at its average value for 
a given country. This additional regression seeks to address the potential endogeneity between fiscal 
consolidation and decentralization. It concerns the fact that as central government expenditure is reduced (as a 
result of consolidation efforts), the decentralization ratio mechanically increases (as the denominator decreases). 
The fact that our results are robust across columns 2 and 3 (Table 2) ensures that the parameter identified on 
edec is not driven by this mechanical mechanism occurring in the time-series dimension of our data (i.e. the 
time variability of edec is neglected in the estimate reported in column 3). 
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[Figure 2 about here] 
 
 
The rest of the right-hand side variables in the model present the expected signs, but many are 
not statistically significant. On the macroeconomic side, it emerges that an increase in interest 
payments makes it more likely that a consolidation period will be terminated earlier. On the political 
side, we find that right-wing governments tend to consolidate for longer periods, ceteris paribus. 
While the political cycle does not appear to affect the duration of the consolidation episodes (the 
coefficient associated with the election year dummy is not statistically significant), the coefficient for 
type of government shows a significant and negative impact. Another interesting result is that 
consolidations based on tax hikes are more likely to result in shorter consolidation episodes.  
Thus, our initial duration analysis suggests that fiscal decentralization has a significant effect 
on the duration of fiscal consolidation. We seek now to identify the channel responsible for this effect. 
On the one hand, more decentralized countries may find it easier to consolidate for longer periods 
simply because central governments can shift the adjustment burden down to sub-national sectors. On 
the other hand, the positive impact on duration could be due to the fact that sub-national governments 
contribute substantially to the stabilization function of economies making it easier to sustain longer 
lasting consolidation efforts. The first effect would be more pronounced if fewer legal powers have 
been transferred to sub-national sectors: if sub-central governments are responsible for large shares of 
expenditure but do not possess the corresponding revenue power, it is easy for the central government 
to cut transfers to the detriment of lower governmental layers. We test this hypothesis by augmenting 
the model with the respective indicators of real autonomy and their interaction terms with 
decentralization. The results are presented in Table 3. 
 
[Table 3 about here] 
 
In general, the negative coefficient presented by expenditure decentralization holds across all 
specifications. However, the baseline effect is only significant when the indicator for executive 
influence is included in the model, which might indicate a problem of collinearity, given that in some 
instances expenditure decentralization might evolve in line with the real autonomy variables. 
Including an interaction term in model (1) between expenditure decentralization and a real autonomy 
indicator (any one of the three included separately in the model) results in a positive and statistically 
significant coefficient associated with the main effect of fiscal autonomy and a negative coefficient on 
the interaction term. This implies that decentralized countries consolidate for longer periods but that 
the fiscal autonomy of sub-national governmental tiers can dampen this to the point that the result is 
offset if sub-national governments have enough real autonomy over their fiscal policies. To interpret 
the negative interaction term and to illustrate the overall effect, we plot the survival functions in 
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Figures 3-5 for different combinations of the two variables, introducing the three real autonomy 
variables separately. 
 
[Figures 3, 4, and 5 about here] 
 
In Figure 3, the line furthest to the left represents the effect obtained with a high degree of 
fiscal autonomy at sub-national levels and a low degree of expenditure decentralization (20%). 
Countries with these characteristics tend to consolidate for shorter periods of time. With the same 
level of expenditure decentralization, but with no fiscal autonomy, the consolidation spells have, on 
average, a slightly longer duration as the survival curve shifts to the right. This indicates that, in 
countries that have quite a high degree of centralization, higher real fiscal autonomy might avoid the 
adjustment burden being shifted to sub-national sectors (whether this indeed happens is analyzed in 
the next step after discussing the other effects of real autonomy on duration). Turning to the countries 
characterized by high degrees of decentralization (around 50%), the curves shift as expected to the 
right, as higher decentralization increases survival probability, that is, the probability of having longer 
consolidation spells. In fact, these two survival functions furthest to the right almost overlap. With no 
fiscal autonomy (red line), the main effect of decentralization is found to prevail, as the interaction 
term and the main effect of fiscal autonomy are equal to zero. However, when switching to a high 
autonomy regime, we would expect a shift to the left, as such regimes were found to consolidate for 
shorter periods of time. However, this effect is largely offset by the negative interaction term, which 
acquires considerable relative importance.11 At this level of decentralization, it seems that switching 
from a high- to low-fiscal autonomy model of decentralization no longer affects the duration of the 
consolidation episodes. 
Results for real executive influence, illustrated in Figure 4, are in line with those obtained for 
fiscal autonomy. This suggests that decentralization does not only operate via the interaction term, but 
it also shifts the survival function to the right by itself. While the order of the lines is the same as in 
Figure 3, the impact of decentralization now more than offsets the reduction in the survival 
probability due to executive influence. Figure 5 completes the analysis by showing the results for the 
indicator for the co-determination of national decision-making (shared ruling). Again the results are 
similar to those obtained for the other two indicators, suggesting that the most important component 
in the institutional arrangements is the fiscal element and highlighting the importance of the proper 
design of the fiscal institutions shaping intergovernmental relations. 
Thus, the results so far suggest that countries with a high degree of decentralization tend to 
consolidate for longer periods; however, this effect is mitigated by increasing levels of real autonomy 
in the hands of sub-central governments. In contrast, if countries are decentralized to a lower degree 
                                                          
11 Note that the maximum value of fiscal autonomy is equal to 2, while we assume edec to be equal to 50. 
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(here 20%), central governments can shift the burden of longer periods of consolidation to these lower 
tiers of government, unless, that is, they are shielded by some element of real autonomy. If they have 
a sufficiently high degree of real autonomy, the duration of consolidation periods tends not to be so 
long. However, with a high degree of decentralization with respect to expenditure, real autonomy 
essentially makes little difference.  
 
4.2 The effects on sub-national public finances 
The second step in the analysis, the estimation of Equation (2), seeks to determine whether the fact 
that more decentralized economies consolidate for longer periods is driven by cuts in transfers to sub-
national tiers of government. Table 4 suggests that both implementing consolidation measures and the 
duration of such measures (consolidation and consolidation time, respectively) negatively affect the 
change in intergovernmental transfers. In other words, when statistically significant, the effect of 
consolidation periods on sub-national public finances is negative. This suggests that fiscal 
consolidation in the past has reduced the intergovernmental transfers received by local governments. 
In addition, the negative baseline effect of consolidation is even greater in magnitude when 
controlling for real sub-central autonomy (mainly fiscal autonomy and executive influence, as 
observed in columns 2, 3 and 5).  
 
[Table 4 about here] 
 
An examination of the effect of real sub-central autonomy seems to show that only shared 
ruling significantly and positively affects the change in intergovernmental transfers (columns 4 and 
8). This means that if a regional government or its representatives can exercise authority over the 
institutional set-up by co-determining the national legislation and policy through intergovernmental 
meetings (e.g., by either directly participating in making national law or by sharing executive 
responsibilities with the national government for implementing policy either in the region or in the 
country as a whole),12 central government transfers may increase. This suggests that the more regions 
are able to write the rules of the game, the more they are likely to obtain in terms of resources from a 
bargaining process with the central authority. 
In order to analyze the joint effect of consolidation and real local autonomy on the change in 
transfers, it therefore seems worth considering the interaction between the two. In this respect, Figure 
6 plots the marginal effect of a consolidation period on the log-difference of transfers for all the 
possible values of the fiscal autonomy variable. 
                                                          
12 An example is provided by the State-Regions Conference in Italy, at which the central government, the 
regions and the autonomous provinces of Trento and Bolzano promote cooperation between the activities of the 
State and the Regions and Autonomous Provinces. This Conference is the arena for the political negotiations 
between the central government and the regional autonomies. All aspects of supranational European policy of 
regional and provincial interest are also discussed in this framework. 
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[Figure 6 about here] 
 
The slope of the interaction terms proves not to be significant in the regression. Nevertheless, 
the figure provides a number of interesting insights. First, during consolidation periods, transfers to 
lower levels of government are substantially reduced as the impact of consolidation is negative and 
different from zero. This suggests that consolidation – at least partially – has been achieved in the past 
by reducing transfers to sub-national levels, confirming the stylized facts presented in Vammalle and 
Hulbert (2013). However, the effect is only different from zero as long as real autonomy, measured 
here in terms of fiscal autonomy, is not sufficiently large. Sub-national sectors with a high degree of 
fiscal autonomy can use this additional power to prevent central cuts in their transfer revenue. 
Similar evidence is offered when repeating the exercise with the other two indicators of real 
sub-central autonomy, that is, executive influence and shared ruling (Figures 7 and 8, respectively).  
 
[Figures 7 & 8 about here] 
 
While the slope becomes flatter, the estimated averages are still negative, indicating transfer 
cuts during consolidation periods. Here again, sub-national sectors that enjoy substantial influence in 
policy making do not experience any significant reductions in transfers during consolidation periods, 
given that for higher values of this indicator, consolidation periods are not characterized by any 
significant cuts in transfers to lower levels of government. 
 
4.3 The success of consolidation 
The last step in our analysis examines the success of the consolidation episodes in terms of the 
reduction achieved in the public debt/GDP ratio and the improvement attained in the budget 
balance/GDP ratio. This step builds on previous studies that have adopted similar measures to identify 
successful fiscal consolidations (e.g., Alesina and Perotti, 1995; Heylen and Everaert, 2000; Alesina 
and Ardagna, 2010).13 Table 5 shows the average changes in the budget balance/GDP and public 
debt/GDP ratios during the consolidation episodes in our sample. Statistics are presented for the full 
sample as well as for the two sub-samples of countries grouped by their degree of decentralization, i.e. 
considering expenditure decentralization below and above its average. 
 
[Table 5 about here] 
                                                          
13 It should be noted that since the consolidation episodes of the dataset that we use are identified through a 
narrative approach, such episodes do not necessarily entail specific changes in variables such the ratio of public 
deficit over GDP, or of the CAPB/GDP. However, it is customary to label as successful those consolidation 
efforts thanks to which such ratios are successfully increased. 
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On average, the primary balance/GDP ratio improves during periods of consolidation, with 
annual values between +0.44 and +2.01 percentage points of GDP. Long consolidation episodes 
achieve substantial cumulative increases in this ratio, with a maximum of +16.11, which is the 
average total change for the two eight-year periods in the sample. In most cases, the average yearly 
improvement in the primary balance/GDP ratio is greater for less decentralized countries (i.e. with 
values of expenditure decentralization below the edec mean), particularly for very short consolidation 
episodes. For example, in the nine one-year consolidations in countries with a low degree of 
decentralization, the primary balance/GDP ratio improved by an average of 1.54 percentage points, 
while in more decentralized countries it increased by just 0.55 percentage points of GDP. A further 
finding, which is unsurprising given the results of our analysis above, is that the majority of the short-
lived episodes of consolidation are concentrated in the sub-sample of countries with low levels of 
expenditure decentralization. 
Table 5 also reports the impact on the public debt/GDP ratio, where the total change is 
calculated as the value of debt/GDP at the end of the consolidation period minus its value in the year 
immediately preceding the start of the consolidation episode. On average, the debt/GDP ratio 
increases when governments reduce the primary deficit, something that can only be explained in terms 
of the adverse effects on GDP of the consolidation efforts and high interest payments in these periods. 
In fact, Perotti (2012) convincingly argues that the four cases normally presented as proof that 
austerity measures can be expansionary should be considered exceptions rather than the rule. In our 
sample, the debt/GDP ratio increases on average during consolidation episodes, in many cases quite 
notably (for instance, the average increase for the three five-year episodes is equal to +21.32). 
Interestingly, when episodes of the same length appear in both sub-samples, the highest average 
increases in debt/GDP are concentrated in the sub-sample of the less decentralized countries (the one 
exception being the debt increase during the two-year long consolidation episodes). 
Thus, our evidence not only shows that consolidation episodes are of longer duration when 
expenditure decentralization is higher, it also seems to indicate that improvements in the primary 
balance/GDP ratio are, on average, less pronounced. Our results are in line with those reported by 
Darby et al. (2005), who use a smaller unbalanced panel of 15 OECD countries for the period 1970–
1999,14 and find that high levels of expenditure decentralization may result in a fiscal environment 
that is not conducive to successful consolidation attempts. 
While the previous exercise was carried out for the general government, the following (and 
final) analysis of the success of consolidation seeks to disentangle the consequences of consolidation 
for central and local public finances, respectively. We estimate simple econometric models with the 
change in the central and local government debt/GDP ratios (introduced separately) as dependent 
                                                          
14 Their fiscal consolidation measures are defined as discretionary attempts to improve general government 
fiscal balances. 
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variables, and with the variables characterizing the consolidation episodes on the right-hand side. 
Results are reported in Table 6 and they show that there is a positive correlation between both 
consolidation events (i.e. consolidation) and their duration (i.e. consolidation time) with increases in 
the change of the central governments’ debt/GDP ratios, although the estimated coefficients are not 
statistically significant (see columns 1 and 6). In the case of the change in sub-national debt, the 
correlation with consolidation is positive while that with duration is negative, but once again the 
coefficients are not statistically significantly different from zero (see columns 2 and 7).  
 
[Table 6 about here] 
 
However, some statistically significant evidence of consolidation emerges when controlling 
for the level of real sub-national autonomy (see columns 4 and 5). Indeed, the coefficient on fiscal 
consolidation is positive and becomes significant, suggesting that the change in sub-national debt-to-
GDP ratio increases when consolidation packages are implemented at the country level. This “shift” 
effect from central to local government public finances during consolidation seems in fact to be 
mitigated by the real authority exerted by sub-national governments, as demonstrated by the negative 
(and significant) coefficients of the interaction terms. Hence, in countries with enough real sub-
national autonomy, the increase in the variation of the debt/GDP ratio is lower during a consolidation 
episode. This confirms the hypothesis that sub-national governments with sufficient political power 
and influence in central politics are shielded against this type of intervention, and is in line with the 
results reported by Foremny and von Hagen (2013), who find a similar effect for federal vs. unitary 
countries. 
Similar results hold in the case of consolidation time as shown in column 9, where the 
interaction between consolidation time and executive influence is negative and statistically significant, 
while the coefficient on consolidation time alone is positive. Ultimately, consolidation efforts at the 
national level can worsen local public sectors – i.e. increasing their change in debt-to-GDP ratio – if 
the latter do not have sufficient authority, responsibility and participation with respect to the central 
government and its fiscal decisions.  
 
5. Conclusion  
The need to adjust public finances and address government fiscal imbalances has generated a heated 
debate as to which fiscal tools (e.g., spending review measures, changes in tax systems) should be 
used and how they should be employed to restore sustainable fiscal positions. Research conducted to 
date has concerned itself primarily with analyzing the welfare and economic effects of the austerity 
measures implemented and with identifying the determinants of successful fiscal adjustment plans. 
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An important issue that has gone largely unexplored in these studies is the duration of these 
fiscal consolidation processes; yet, identifying the elements that might affect it constitutes an 
interesting research question. The IMF has suggested that fiscal institutions may be appropriate tools 
to sustain fiscal adjustment measures over time (Blanchard and Cottarelli, 2010). Among such 
institutions, the organization of intergovernmental fiscal relations between the tiers of political 
authorities appears to be a natural candidate for impacting the length of a consolidation process. On 
the one hand, coordination failures and deficit bias problems may arise in the presence of multiple 
government tiers and agencies; however, on the other, more efficient and effective fiscal adjustments 
may result from the combined action of several political actors in more decentralized systems 
operating under a cooperative institutional framework. Thus, we hypothesize here that the multi-
layered fiscal structure, which characterizes most OECD countries, needs to be taken into account 
when assessing the duration of fiscal consolidations. 
Our paper has analyzed the impact of fiscal decentralization on the duration of consolidation 
episodes in 17 OECD countries between 1978 and 2009. We find that i) consolidation episodes are 
longer in more decentralized countries, but only if sub-national governments have little real autonomy 
over their budgets; and, ii) transfers from central government are cut during consolidation periods, 
and this effect is more pronounced if sub-national authorities have little legal power to influence 
central government decisions. Thus, the local governments that are at greatest risk from fiscal 
retrenchment episodes seem to be those that have a considerable number of spending tasks and 
responsibilities but which are not accompanied by sufficient legal power.  
Although we have not undertaken a formal welfare analysis, it seems that it may well be 
desirable for countries to implement decentralization reforms to mitigate the negative effects of fiscal 
consolidation. Gradual consolidation packages may allow the private sector to adjust more smoothly 
to government spending cuts without suffering any negative disruptions (see Cogan et al., 2013). 
Moreover, “a steady pace of adjustment” is, in general, less harmful for the recovery than a 
frontloading approach (Blanchard and Cottarelli, 2010) and a sustained improvement in government 
fiscal balances is likely to crowd in private domestic investment and net foreign assets in the long run 
(Anderson et al., 2014). In short, institutional settings that favor consolidation processes of longer 
duration are to be preferred. From this perspective, our results contribute to identifying a “new” 
advantage of fiscal decentralization. Hence, structural reforms in this direction coupled with fiscal 
consolidation episodes might offset the negative near-term implications of an austerity policy linked 
to fiscal adjustments. 
The second piece of evidence from our study concerns the implications our results have for 
the political economy. The fact that central governments reduce their transfers to lower tiers during 
fiscal adjustment processes may reveal a (possibly short-sighted) strategy of central governments to 
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shift the adjustment burden onto lower government levels15 in order to appear virtuous in the eyes of 
both the international markets and the supranational institutions. This behavior runs contrary to the 
recommendations of the IMF (2013), which suggests that the best way to achieve credibility is to 
adopt medium-term fiscal plans with a visible anchor (e.g., either an average pace of adjustment or a 
fiscal target to be achieved within a certain period) combined with structural and institutional reforms, 
possibly involving different tiers of government.  
Moreover, the central governments’ behavior of cutting their transfers to sub-national units 
during consolidation episodes may extend these episodes and lead to the loss of political consensus at 
the territorial level, which in turn is likely to be reflected in the results obtained at national 
representative elections. To ensure the success of adjustment strategies, the IMF (2013), in fact, 
recommends a different approach based on the coordination of financial decision-making across 
different government tiers. The difficulties in implementing this coordination may, however, be one 
of the reasons why more decentralized countries manage to achieve, on average, smaller 
improvements in the budget balance/GDP ratio than those recorded by their less decentralized 
counterparts (as we document in the last section of our analysis).  
Furthermore, the distributional effects of such policies across government levels have to be 
given due consideration. All in all, given that budget consolidation measures are normally unpopular, 
the duration of a consolidation episode is also relevant in light of the political support governments 
require in order to implement such measures. In this regard, our findings suggest that the sub-national 
debt-to-GDP ratio increases when consolidation packages are implemented at the country level. This 
shift in the burden onto local public finances seems to be mitigated, however, by the real authority 
enjoyed by the sub-national government and, in particular, on its ability to participate and share in the 
central government’s policy-making and objectives, their implementation, and, ultimately, their 
success.  
 
  
                                                          
15 Actually, this may be also partly attributable to the fact that while many national governments suspended or 
abandoned national fiscal rules following the crisis, rules concerning sub-national deficits and debts often 
remained in force. 
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A. Tables 
 
Table 1: Summary statistics 
  
Source: See text, and authors’ calculations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variables N mean sd min max
consolidation 527 0.315 0.465 0.000 1.000
edec 544 36.588 14.008 8.661 65.605
fiscal autonomy 498 2.088 1.514 0.000 4.800
executive influence 498 0.528 0.747 0.000 2.000
shared ruling 498 3.061 3.352 0.000 12.000
debt 544 57.184 25.844 4.288 134.065
primary balance(t−1) 527 -0.086 3.195 -10.377 9.011
real gdp growth 544 2.487 2.375 -8.354 11.495
election year 544 0.305 0.461 0.000 1.000
government type 544 2.447 1.303 1.000 6.000
right wing 544 0.557 0.497 0.000 1.000
interest rate 527 0.117 1.847 -15.268 9.211
interest payments 527 0.004 0.512 -2.226 2.286
log(transfers) 345 10.529 1.295 7.149 13.164
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Table 2: Baseline results of the duration analysis 
  
Notes: Survival time estimation assuming the Weibull survival distribution. Robust standard errors in 
parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. 
 
  
Survival Time (1) (2) (3)
Decentralization
edec -0.030*** -0.032***
(0.008) (0.008)
Controls
primary balance(t−1) -0.067* -0.056 -0.071**
(0.036) (0.036) (0.035)
debt(t−1) 0.020 0.006 0.005
(0.028) (0.029) (0.029)
debt -0.040 -0.025 -0.025
(0.028) (0.028) (0.028)
Δ interest payments 0.498*** 0.497*** 0.493***
(0.167) (0.165) (0.171)
real gdp growth -0.188*** -0.139** -0.142**
(0.055) (0.057) (0.056)
Δ interest rate 0.036 0.000 -0.002
(0.051) (0.052) (0.052)
election year 0.107 0.119 0.110
(0.163) (0.165) (0.167)
right wing -0.548*** -0.273 -0.271
(0.169) (0.183) (0.181)
government type -0.703*** -0.406** -0.406**
(0.169) (0.190) (0.185)
tax based consolidation 0.248* 0.209** 0.201**
(0.131) (0.088) (0.082)
Hazard parameters
Constant -0.156 0.407 0.476*
(0.245) (0.283) (0.283)
ln(ρ) 0.667*** 0.712*** 0.715***
(0.051) (0.052) (0.052)
Number of observations 166 166 166
29 
 
Table 3: Duration analysis with interaction effects 
 
Notes: Survival time estimation assuming the Weibull survival distribution. Robust standard errors in 
parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. All models replicate Model (3) of Table 2 but include the 
respective interaction terms. 
 
Survival Time (1) (2) (3)
Decentralization
edec -0.013 -0.022** -0.023
(0.018) (0.011) (0.015)
Autonomy
fiscal autonomy 0.508**
(0.241)
executive influence 2.571***
(0.822)
shared ruling 0.142*
(0.078)
Interaction terms
fiscal autonomy · edec -0.011*
(0.006)
executive influence · edec -0.056***
(0.019)
shared ruling · edec -0.031
(0.031)
Controls
primary balance(t−1) -0.077** -0.151*** -0.078**
(0.036) (0.039) (0.038)
debt(t−1) 0.023 0.033 0.015
(0.032) (0.033) (0.033)
debt -0.041 -0.052 -0.035
(0.031) (0.032) (0.032)
Δ interest payments 0.553*** 0.497*** 0.447**
(0.173) (0.153) (0.180)
real gdp growth -0.145** -0.145** -0.146**
(0.063) (0.064) (0.065)
Δ interest rate -0.016 -0.042 -0.012
(0.054) (0.049) (0.055)
election year 0.109 0.155 0.088
(0.169) (0.159) (0.172)
right wing -0.110 -0.111 -0.379*
(0.209) (0.196) (0.196)
government type -0.276 0.035 -0.297
(0.219) (0.213) (0.205)
tax based consolidation 0.204** 0.194** 0.221**
(0.089) (0.091) (0.095)
Hazard parameters
Constant -0.652 -0.520 0.069
(0.691) (0.425) (0.381)
ln(ρ) 0.718*** 0.751*** 0.711***
(0.051) (0.058) (0.051)
Number of observations 162 162 162
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Table 4: The effects of consolidation on the change in intergovernmental transfers received by sub-central governments. 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.  
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
consolidation -0.044** -0.074** -0.050** -0.052
(0.015) (0.025) (0.021) (0.032)
fiscal autonomy -0.011 -0.008
(0.012) (0.010)
consolidation*fiscal autonomy 0.014
(0.010)
executive influence 0.023 0.018
(0.053) (0.053)
consolidation*executive influence 0.007
(0.021)
shared ruling 0.032*** 0.028***
(0.010) (0.006)
consolidation*shared ruling 0.000
(0.008)
consolidation time -0.008** -0.018* -0.010 -0.017
(0.003) (0.009) (0.007) (0.010)
consolidation time*fiscal autonomy 0.003
(0.002)
consolidation time*executive influence 0.003
(0.007)
consolidation time*shared ruling 0.002
(0.002)
Constant 0.121*** 0.138*** 0.109*** 0.016 0.108*** 0.127*** 0.099*** 0.016
(0.020) (0.029) (0.033) (0.042) (0.019) (0.028) (0.031) (0.029)
Observations 285 285 285 285 285 285 285 285
R-squared 0.150 0.156 0.152 0.171 0.146 0.154 0.147 0.169
Number of id 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15
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Table 5: Average changes in deficit/GDP and debt/GDP during consolidation episodes 
  
Source: Devries et al. (2011) and authors’ calculations. The countries with below average expenditure 
decentralization are: Austria, Belgium, France, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and the UK. The 
countries with above average expenditure decentralization are: Australia, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Germany, 
Japan, Sweden, and the USA. 
1 (13) 1.24 1.24 2.81 2.81
2 (15) 0.72 1.44 1.38 2.77
3 (5) 0.91 2.72 2.17 6.52
4 (6) 0.99 3.98 2.15 8.61
5 (3) 0.52 2.61 4.26 21.32
6 (5) 1.12 6.75 2.12 12.70
7 (1) 1.44 10.05 3.57 24.97
8 (2) 2.01 16.11 3.16 25.31
9 (1) 0.44 3.92 0.26 2.36
14 (1) 0.57 7.93 2.71 37.92
1 (9) 1.54 1.54 3.62 3.62
2 (10) 0.83 1.66 0.58 1.15
3 (4) 0.95 2.84 2.28 6.84
4 (3) 1.08 4.31 2.30 9.19
6 (2) 0.77 4.63 2.64 15.84
7 (1) 1.44 10.05 3.57 24.97
8 (2) 2.01 16.11 3.16 25.31
1 (4) 0.55 0.55 0.98 0.98
2 (5) 0.50 1.01 3.01 6.01
3 (1) 0.74 2.23 1.74 5.23
4 (3) 0.91 3.65 2.01 8.02
5 (3) 0.52 2.61 4.26 21.32
6 (3) 1.36 8.16 1.77 10.61
9 (1) 0.44 3.92 0.26 2.36
14 (1) 0.57 7.93 2.71 37.92
Expenditure decentralization below average
Expenditure decentralization above average
Full sample
Change in debt/GDPChange in balance/GDPEpisodes' length 
(no. of episodes 
in parenthesis)
yearly total yearly total
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Table 6: The effects of consolidation on the change of central and sub-central debt/GDP ratio 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. 
central debt central debt
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
consolidation 0.008 0.007 0.004 0.025* 0.034**
(0.011) (0.014) (0.021) (0.012) (0.015)
consolidation time 0.000 -0.001 -0.002 0.006* 0.005
(0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.003) (0.004)
fiscal autonomy 0.010 0.008
(0.024) (0.024)
consolidation*fiscal autonomy 0.001
(0.008)
executive influence 0.339 0.307
(0.241) (0.242)
consolidation*executive influence -0.028*
(0.014)
shared ruling -0.074* -0.072
(0.042) (0.042)
consolidation*shared ruling -0.007*
(0.004)
consolidation time*fiscal autonomy 0.000
(0.001)
consolidation time*executive influence -0.008**
(0.003)
consolidation time*shared ruling -0.001
(0.001)
Constant 0.064 -0.015 -0.041 -0.223 0.230 0.067 -0.013* -0.032 -0.207 0.220
(0.072) (0.011) (0.060) (0.147) (0.149) (0.072) (0.006) (0.059) (0.151) (0.142)
Observations 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257
R-squared 0.595 0.171 0.172 0.189 0.203 0.594 0.170 0.171 0.189 0.194
Number of id 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17
sub-central debt sub-central debt
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B. Figures 
 
Figure 1: Kaplan-Meier survival function 
 
 
Figure 2: Survival function: survival probability and decentralization 
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Figure 3: Survival function: impact of decentralization and fiscal autonomy 
 
 
Figure 4: Survival function: impact of decentralization and executive influence 
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Figure 5: Survival function: impact of decentralization and shared ruling 
 
 
Figure 6: Consolidation burden on transfers: impact of fiscal autonomy 
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Figure 7: Consolidation burden on transfers: impact of executive influence 
 
Figure 8: Consolidation burden on transfers: impact of shared ruling 
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